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ABSTRACT
BRADY COLE: Explaining the Yellow Vest Movement in France
(Under the direction of Josh Hendrickson)
Les Gilets Jaunes, or the yellow vests, is a movement of protestors that have had a
large presence in France since 2018. Beginning as an online petition against French
President Emmanuel Macron’s fuel tax hike, the movement has quickly amassed several
hundred thousand protestors in Paris and other cities across the country. It is the objective
of this thesis to examine potential reasons why 300,000 people have felt the need to
protest throughout France, apart from the now rescinded fuel tax.
To this end, a sample of data from the Varieties of Democracy database was
selected. These variables covered various aspects of French politics and society. The
residual for each of the ten variables, explaining the actual value of the variable when
controlling for various factors, was used to determine whether or not the values of these
variables were higher or lower than predicted. Six of the variables were discovered to be
lower than anticipated, which was expected to be correlated with an increase in protest
activity. The remaining four variables, being higher than expected, were determined not
to be possible explanations for the yellow vest movement.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that when we think of other people, we often imagine a stereotype
or two. Whether from a positive or negative perspective, people from other countries fall
victim to stereotyping quite frequently, and the French are no exception. Ask someone
what opinions they carry with regards to the French, if any. More than likely, one of the
responses might be that they smoke all the time. Or maybe it’s that they have the best
food in the world.
One of the most frequently recognized stereotypes of the French is that they
complain a lot. Even during something as small as a surprise visit by the president. This
was certainly the case for Angers, a relatively small town located about two hours west of
Paris. This visit by Macron was met with disdain by the locals, simply due to the
disruption in “la vie quotidienne”, or daily life. Vincent Cassel, a French actor, once said
that the French are never happy with what they have, and that they’re always
complaining. Even further, in a Bastille Day address to all of France, former President
François Hollande stated,
“There is a sort of illness, which is not serious but can be contagious, where we
are always deploring and denigrating. You have to be proud! Don’t speak well of
the president – I’m not asking you that much. Or of the government – I hope that
will come later. But speak well of your country” (France-Presse 2014).
While Hollande’s statement was made in 2014, it is just as relevant today, as we are
living in what could be referred to as a protest culture.
Culture of this nature is present in countries across the globe, from Hong Kong,
Lebanon, the United States, and France of course. In cities all over France for the past
few years, there have been protests almost every Saturday or Sunday. One could observe
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demonstrations on the current state of the Paris Climate Accords or widespread strikes by
railway employees with ease. However, the most common types of protests by a large
margin, have been by les Gilets Jaunes, also known as the “yellow vest” protestors by
those in the United States.
1.1 Les Gilets Jaunes: Who, Where, and Why?
In May 2018, just one year after the inauguration of Emmanuel Macron, there
appeared an online petition, that garnered quite a large following. In fact, support reached
a million persons relatively quickly. Citizens continued to sign the petition to repeal the
fuel tax hikes implemented by Macron in an effort to combat climate change. Soon
thereafter, people began to take to the streets. At first, citizens of the countryside began
public demonstrations as a response to both the high costs of living and Macron’s green
tax. Protestors donned yellow roadside safety vests. These are the same which are
required by law to be in the vehicles of all French motorists. These yellow vests also
represent uniforms for many French citizens employed in construction, road work, or
commercial driving. These workers, known as la classe ouvrière, were disproportionally
affected by Macron’s fuel tax.
The vests took off as a symbol, and soon massive public protests were taking
place all over the country. Many of these protests have resulted in widespread damage,
especially in Paris. Protestors, or possibly anarchists taking advantage of the situation,
damaged many landmarks in the city, such as the Arc de Triomphe and the Tomb of the
Unknown Soldier.
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It is easy for anyone distanced from the situation to simply dismiss the protestors
and their claims. However, the sheer volume of participants and the passion with which
they have protested certainly give credibility to the idea that something major is
happening in France. With hundreds of arrests and millions of dollars’ worth of estimated
damages across several protests, it is difficult to deny that the yellow vest protestors have
been a large thorn in the side of Macron and his administration. So much so, in fact, that
he eventually gave in to the protestors, by reversing the fuel tax hike that sparked the
protests in the first place.
This repeal was enacted in late 2018, to be removed from France’s official budget
for 2019. However, protests have continued all over the country, as the yellow vests
continue their “reign of terror” on Macron and the French government. Demonstrations
have taken place as recently as March 14, 2020 in Paris.
1.2 Research Question
In regards to all of the fervor with which the yellow vests are decrying Macron
and his administration, it begs the question: what exactly is going on in France? Why is it
that approximately three hundred thousand protestors have felt compelled to take to the
streets? This thesis seeks first to analyze the directives and demands that have been made
by the yellow vest movement. Then, these demands will be compared to data obtained
from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database.
The Varieties of Democracy variables measure different aspects of the French
political regime and other aspects of society, such as educational inequality. These
variables will primarily be used to determine whether or not the claims made by the
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protestors are supported by the numbers and/or figures. Other data may be used to
provide additional information regarding inequality. Such data and sources will be
addressed as they are used. Ultimately, this thesis does not seek to determine exactly
what has caused these protests to continue following the rescinded fuel tax hike. Rather,
the objective is simply to determine what economic and political factors under Macron’s
administration have fueled the fire of the yellow vest protests, and which explanations
can be ruled out.
In my analysis, I determined that some of the selected variables could possibly be
used to explain these protests, and that some could not. More specifically, six of the
selected variables, ranging from executive respect of the constitution to educational
equality, could possibly be used to explain the initiation and continuity of the yellow vest
movement. On the other hand, four variables, ranging from legislative corruption to rates
of corruption by public exchanges by public sector employees, could not be used to
explain the movement. Given that my analysis contained a total of 11 variables out of a
possible 564 variables from the database, it is certainly possible that unselected variables
or external factors have also contributed to the existence of the yellow vests.
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2. REQUESTS / DEMANDS
Having briefly discussed the origins of the yellow vest movement in France, it
seems only natural to ask what the movement wants, or what it is that they are hoping to
achieve through these often-violent demonstrations. All movements have goals, and the
yellow vests are no exception. In fact, because this is such a large, albeit scattered
movement, there have been many different demands that have arisen from chapters of the
movement across the country. Fortunately, an “official” list has been compiled,
encompassing roughly twenty-five demands of the French government. Attached to these
demands is the quote, “These propositions will immediately change daily life for the
French. The simple demands nine and ten can recuperate up to 130 billion euros to the
public treasury each year. France is a rich country, her people valiant and hardworking,
she does not have to live in misery” (Lawrence 2018).
The yellow vest demands can be organized into four different categories
concerning different aspects of France and the lives of its citizens. The four categories are
economy/work, politics, health/environment, and foreign affairs. Within these four
categories lay the proposed plan that the protestors believe is the remedy for the current
socioeconomic issues that they think the country is facing. These demands range from
legislation aimed at combatting tax evasion by the ultra-wealthy, to following in the
footsteps of the United Kingdom by leaving the European Union in a movement aptly
and familiarly named “Frexit”. In the next section, each category will be broken down, as
the demands are explained in greater detail.
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2.1 Economy / Work
There are a few demands specific to the French economy, ranging from a revision
of tax law to cancellation of debts. The first demand pertaining to the French economy
calls for the constitutional ceiling on tax rates to be set at no more than twenty-five
percent. Tax rates obtained from the Direction Générale des Finances Publiques (Public
Finances Directorate General) are listed below (Direction Générale des Finances
Publiques 2016).

Figure 2-1 – Income tax rates in France (Overview of the French Tax System, Section V)

The top income tax rate (as of 2016) was listed at 45% for any euros earned above the
level of €152,260. That is to say, the 152,261st would be taxed at 45%, while any
earnings preceding would be taxed at 41%. For comparison, the top marginal tax rate in
the United States is approximately 37%. The yellow vest movement seeks to drastically
cut these rates to a level not to exceed 25% at the highest tax bracket, slightly over half
the current maximum.
Next, the movement seeks to reform France’s social security program. The pension
payment rate in France varies from a minimum of 37.5% of annual earnings to a
maximum of 50% (Cleiss). The yellow vests seek to increase the amount paid by
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approximately 40%, in an effort to combat the somewhat high rates of poverty for the
elderly (Statista).
The third demand seeks to establish incredibly large construction projects in order to
provide housing for roughly five million homeless French citizens. As a means of
enforcement, severe penalties would be implemented for cities or departments that fail to
provide such housing for their homeless constituents.
The yellow vests also seek to break up the “big banks” such as BNP Paribas, Crédit
Agricole Group, and Société Générale Group. Going along with this, the movement
wishes to establish a separation between investment banking and regular banking. The
fifth and final demand pertaining to the French economy revolves around debt.
Household debt has increased to a total of 60.6% of GDP as of the second quarter of 2019
(tradingeconomics). To fight this, the protestors aim to cancel (or forgive) all types of
debts accrued through usurious rates of interest. It should be noted, however, that the
movement has not defined the range of interest rates that would qualify such debts to be
forgiven.
2.2 Politics
It is clear that the yellow vests are quite antagonistic towards the Macron
administration. The nine demands below reveal their distaste with the current state of
French politics. The first is a revision of the very foundations of the government, by
amending the French constitution in order to protect people’s interests. These new
amendments should include binding referenda. To further protect the interests of citizens
and individuals in France, they also seek a barring of both lobby groups and interest
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groups from having an impact on political decision-making. A new lobbying law was
implemented on the first of May in 2018 in an effort to increase transparency to the
public with regards to the decision-making process. However, the cultural acceptance
continues to lag, and protestors in France would likely seek much stricter legislation, if
not a complete ban as suggested by the yellow vests (Europarl).
Among the several demands falling into this category lies a somewhat familiar
notion: leaving the European Union in a move named aptly (if not a little derivative)
Frexit. The Ipsos Sopra-Steria poll taken by the French newspaper Le Monde found that
of all respondents, only about 36%, just over a third, distrusted the European Union while
a majority of voters believe that France has been on the decline economically and socially
in the years following Macron’s election. The protestors seem to believe that leaving the
EU would help restore economic and political sovereignty for the country.
Yellow vest participants also seek higher levels of enforcement and harsher
punishment for the problem of tax evasion by France’s “ultra-wealthy”. In 2012, a large
case was presented by the French government against UBS, a Swiss bank that allegedly
aided French citizens in hiding wealth from authorities from 2004 to 2012. They were
ordered to pay a record sum of about $4.2 billion. Other large banks have faced similar
suits, with Credit Suisse being fined three-hundred million euros (Alderman).
Their next demand calls for the immediate cessation of privatization, as well as the
re-nationalization of public goods such as motorways, airports, railways run by the
SNCF, and many others. France finalized a law in 2018 allowing for various state assets
to be privatized, among them several airports (including Charles de Gaulle) in Paris.
Meanwhile, massive strikes and a debt valued at approximately forty-five billion euros
8

have the SNCF stuck between a rock and a hard place. With France moving towards
more and more privatization, the yellow vests would see a complete reversal of Macron’s
legislation, creating more state-run assets (like the SNCF) and public goods.
In France, separation between church and state, what is referred to as “laïcité”,
has been around since the earliest days of their constitution, appearing in the first article:
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure
the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion.”
The topic appears also in the preamble to the Constitution of October 27th, 1946: “The
Nation guarantees equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational training
and culture. The provision of free, public, and secular education at all levels is a duty of
the state.” However, it is the belief of the protestors that there still exist non-secular
practices within schools and/or universities, and they therefore require that all ideology
be removed from the ministry of education, ending what they refer to as “destructive”
educational techniques.
The yellow vests then call for the destruction of any and all existing media
monopolies, in order to remove their interference in politics. Lastly, an amendment
should be drafted and added to the Constitution providing for a complete prohibition on
state interference in the personal decisions of French citizens concerning matters of
education, health, and of the family.
2.3 Health / Environment
The third category of demands made by the movement consist of those revolving
around health and the environment. They first seek from the country’s durable goods
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producers a mandatory guarantee that their products will last a minimum of ten years, and
that during this window, spare parts will be readily available. This demand was made
against the perceived possibility of practicing “planned obsolescence”, in which
producers produce goods that become obsolete rather quickly and thus require either
replacing or upgrading. A common example of this practice is the usage of nondurable
materials, commonly materials such as irreplaceable batteries in phones or laptops. A
reduction in these materials, and in planned obsolescence, if it indeed is being practiced,
would possibly correlate to a decrease in material waste and possibly pollution.
When France drafted the Paris Climate Accords in December 2015, the idea was
to reduce its carbon footprint of all signatories, and consequently, global pollution.
However, many in France seem to believe that France has done little, if anything, in the
way of achieving this goal, and the actions that they have taken have been met with firm
resistance. For example, in Macron’s efforts to enforce the accords and make France
“greener”, he enacted his quite infamous fuel tax hike, which led to violent and sustained
revolts in Paris and throughout the rest of the country. The protestors wanted the tax
hikes overturned, and were eventually granted this request by Macron. While this request
was granted, the movement seeks to go further in their actions for the environmental
health of France by enacting a ban on plastic bottles and any other polluting packaging
materials. They also seek to ban all genetically modified crops, carcinogenic pesticides,
endocrine disruptors, and monocrops (growing the same crop on the same land over
time).
They then attack pharmaceutical companies, affectionately known as “big
pharma”. Companies such as Sanofi who, amongst others, enjoy what the movement
10

thinks is too much influence on healthcare and hospitals. Sanofi, for example, obtained
roughly 1.891 billion euros in revenue from vaccines of influenza, and 1.946 billion euros
from vaccines of polio. The movement desires to reduce this profitability and to weaken
the influence that these companies have (Mikulic). Lastly, the yellow vests want to see a
reindustrialized France, with a lower dependence on other countries and thus, a reduction
of imports. They believe that the reduced amount of imports would consequently lead to
a decrease in pollution, as the number of transports coming into the country are reduced.
2.4 Foreign Affairs
There is a fourth category, containing four or five of the last demands on the
official list. These are the demands pertaining to reforms regarding France’s foreign
affairs. The first demand regarding foreign affairs calls for a cessation in France’s
participation in foreign wars of aggression, and an exit from NATO. The second calls for
an exit from what they refer to as “Francafrique” or Franco-Africa. The movement seeks
to establish relations with African states on an equal peer-to-peer basis, and thus France
must stop the practices of pillaging and interfering – politically and militarily –in Africa.
To this end, the movement demands a repatriation of all French soldiers, removing
military presence in Africa.
Next, the yellow vests demand a prevention of migratory flows that they think
France is neither able to accommodate nor integrate. In 2018, France received over
123,000 applications for asylum (an increase of 22% from 2017). The demand increased
a further 7% in the first eight months of 2019 (The Local). The yellow vests desire
stronger borders in order to prevent inflows of this magnitude. The final demand, and the
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simplest, requires that France respect international law and the treaties of which France is
a signatory.
While this category is certainly important to France and these demands are
important to the movement, most of them listed within this category are not relevant for
the purpose of this thesis and thus have not and will not be used in any way, unless
otherwise stated. The remainder, which have been explained above from sections 2.1 to
2.3, were brought together and used in the search of variables within datasets that may
help to explain the specific triggers that have caused this protest movement to arise in the
country. These datasets, variables, and methods, will be discussed in the following
section.
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3. METHOHODOLOGY
The roughly twenty or so official demands made by the yellow vest movement
within the listed categories of economy/work, politics, and health/environment
(excluding foreign affairs – see section 2.4) were compiled and then used in a search for
relevant data, which led to the Variables of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset. The V-Dem,
per their website:
… is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. We provide a
multidimensional and disaggregated dataset that reflects the complexity of the
concept of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of
elections. The V-Dem project distinguishes between five high-level principles of
democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian, and
collects data to measure these principles (V-Dem).
Using the ninth version of their codebook, twenty-three variables were selected as
candidates whose potential changes could have led to the arising of the yellow vest
protest movement. The variables were organized in the codebook according to different
aspects of democracy. Each of these variables and their values were measured annually
from as far back as the beginnings of the First Republic (c. 1871).
The purpose of this thesis is to determine which, if any, of these variables could
be used as potential explanations for the movement. These potential explanations could
then be used in the future as possible predictors of protesting in France. To that end, this
thesis uses regression analysis on STATA, a statistical software often used in economics
research. Each of these variables were input into STATA, and variables with enough
observations and variability were regressed on various dummy, or binary variables.
A dummy variable is one that takes only two values, 0 or 1. For example, a
dummy variable for the First Republic in this regression would have a value of 0 for any
13

years outside the period of the First Republic, and would have a value of 1 for the years
within it. STATA was used in order to regress the selected variables on the dummy
variables for each of the five French republics, the two world wars, as well as a linear
time trend. The constant term in each regression refers to a period of time not pertaining
to any of the five republics, such as the gap between the first two Republics, which
contained the Napoleonic Empires.
For each of these regressions, the residual, which measures changes in any given
variable that cannot be explained by the political regime, was plotted over a more recent
time period pertaining to the yellow vest movement. These residuals were treated like an
exogenous shock, in other words, caused by eternal factors. Transitory, or non-permanent
shocks cannot explain the movement, since these shocks reverse very quickly, and their
short-term effects would not explain the prolonged protesting in France. Large and
persistent shocks represent candidate explanations of the yellow vest movement.
Mathematically, the residual is the difference between the actual measured value
of a variable and the value that the variable was predicted to take. That is to say, if the
residual is zero, the actual observed value of the variable is equal to what was predicted,
given all controls. A positive residual indicates that the value of the variable is higher
than anticipated; a negative residual indicates a value of the variable that is lower than
predicted. For each variable, the residual over time was compared to the definitions of
each variable’s possible values. Examining the changes over time in the residual, and
then comparing these changes to the values that one would expect to be positively
correlated with protests, will either provide or rule out possible explanations for why
these protests are occurring, or what could have caused them.
14

4. DATA / ANALYSIS
There were eleven variables selected as potential candidates for explaining the
yellow vest movement. Social Group Equality (v2clsocgrp), Social Class Equality in
Respect for Civil Liberty (v2clacjust), Civil Society Organization Repression
(v2csreprss), Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration (v2clrspct), Public Sector
Corrupt Exchanges (v2excrptps), Executive Embezzlement and Theft (v2exembez),
Executive Respect of the Constitution (v2exrescon), Legislature Corrupt Activities
(v2lgcrrpt), Educational Equality (v2peedueq), and Power Distributed by Socioeconomic
Position (v2pepwrses). Additionally, a variable for Civil Society Organization AntiSystem Movements (v2csantimv) was regressed in order to see the growth of anti-system
movements over time. As mentioned in the previous section, a regression was run for
each of these variables on STATA, and the residual, measuring the difference between
the actual value of the variable and the predicted variable, was plotted over time. These
graphs were then used in order to determine which variables could possibly explain the
protest movement, and which could not.
4.1 Increase in Anti-System Activity
The variable v2csantimv was selected in order to plot a trend of expected antisystem activity in France. Figure 4-1 below shows that anti-system movement was below
what was predicted in the 1990s. At first, it increased dramatically in the mid-90s and
then gradually until just after 2011. Following a brief decrease, anti-system activity
increased throughout the remainder of the 2010s, and spiked around Macron’s election in
2017. This stark incline is more than likely attributed the yellow vest movement, and has
continued through 2018, the most recent V-Dem data available.
15

Figure 4-1: CSO Anti-System Movement residuals from 1990 to 2018

4.2 Possible Explanations for the Yellow Vest Movement
Of the ten variables whose residuals were plotted, six of them could be used as
possible explanations for the protests. In order for a variable to be considered a possible
explanation, it would have to be true that the residual would increase or decrease toward
a direction that would be consistent with an increase in protests. For example, in a
variable such as executive embezzlement (v2exembez), lower values of the variable are
expected to be positively correlated with protest activity. The lowest possible value
means that members of the executive act as though all public resources were their
personal or family property (Pemstein). Controlling for the political regime, the residual
being lower than expected for the current political regime would indicate that the changes
in this variable could be used as a possible explanation for the arising of these protests.
16

This is what is observed in Figure 4-2, where the residual for v2exembez is relatively
constant from 1990 to 2009 or so, before briefly increasing until around 2012. This
increase is followed by a large decrease which eventually forms a plateau before
decreasing again following Macron’s election in 2017.

Figure 4-2: Executive Embezzlement and Theft residuals from 1990 to 2018

This is simply one example, and there are 5 other selected variables that follow
this same pattern. The second of which is the variable for executive respect for the
constitution, or v2exrecon. The lowest value, zero, indicates that members of the
executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences
(Pemstein). The residual for this variable follows a much simpler pattern than the
preceding example. From 1990 to around 2016-2017, actual executive respect for the
constitution was higher than anticipated, given the current political regime. That is, until
2016-2017, when the residual turns sharply negative, indicating that constitutional respect
17

in France decreased rapidly through 2018, and has not increased since the initial drop.
This is shown in Figure 4-3 below. Consequently, executive respect for the constitution
could also be used as a potential cause of protesting in France.

Figure 4-3: Executive Respects Constitution residuals from 1990 to 2018

The third potential explanatory variable is civil society organization (CSO)
repression (v2csreprss). These organizations are similar to non-governmental
organizations. In the case of this variable, lower values are predicted to be correlated
positively with protests. The lowest value for this variable, 0, indicates severe and violent
repression of CSOs and all members (Pemstein). The residual for this variable steadily
decreased for the entirety of the graph’s range. However, it remained higher than
expected, that is to say the residual remained positive, until around 2004, where it
became lower than expected given all controls. This gradual decrease continued until
around 2016, when the decreased became rapid and sharp. Since lower values of the
18

variable indicate higher amounts of repression, the negative residual means that amounts
of CSO repression actually increased through 2018, seen in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4: CSO Repression residuals from 1990 to 2018

Next is the variable measuring respect of the law by public officials,
which is called rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct) by V-Dem. For
this variable, as with many others, lower values are expected to be correlated with higher
protest activity. Specifically, a value of 0 on this variable indicates that the law is not
respected by public officials, and that arbitrary or biased administration of the law is
rampant (Pemstein). In Figure 4-5, the residual for v2clrspct slowly but consistently
declined, but remained positive (i.e., higher than predicted). This trend continued until
2012-2013, when the residual became lower than predicted, and dropped substantially.
The residual continued to decrease following this drop, but at a lower rate. Therefore,
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beginning in 2012-2013, the actual value of v2clrspct in France was much lower than
expected, meaning that this variable can also be used as a possible explanation for the
yellow vest movement.

Figure 4-5: Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration residuals from 1990 to 2018

The next, and fifth, variable falling under the explanatory category is educational
equality, referred to as v2peedueq in the codebook. Measurements for this variable
become more unequal the lower the values go, leading to 0, which means that the level of
inequality is extreme. More specifically, that provision of high-quality basic education is
extremely unequal and at least 75 percent of children receive such low-quality education
that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adults (Pemstein). The
residual for educational equality follows a very similar pattern to the residual for
v2clrspct. However, the initial gradual decline in this case is much lower, and almost
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horizontal. Following the large decrease, which occurs at around the same time as the
residual for v2clrspct, approximately 2012-2013, there is also a very brief and very small
increase, but the residual remains negative through 2018. In reality, this means that, much
like the variable for rigorous and impartial public administration, actual values of
educational equality remained higher than expected, although only slightly so. They then
decreased dramatically and became much lower than predicted given the political regime
of the time.

Figure 4-6: Education Equality residuals from 1990 to 2018

The last variable in this section is the variable v2pepwrses, which measures the
distribution of power by socioeconomic position. Like preceding variables, the lowest
value of v2pepwrses is expected to be correlated with an increase in protest activity. A
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zero in this variable means that wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political
power, and that average or poorer people have almost no influence (Pemstein). The
residual follows an interesting, relatively unique pattern, shown in Figure 4-7. Like with
others before it, the residual for v2pepwrses begins with a gradual decrease, followed by
a large decrease continuing through 2018. What differs is that from the beginning in
1990, the actual levels of power distribution according to socioeconomic position were
already lower than what was predicted. Preceding the residual’s drop, it actually increases
enough that the residual briefly becomes positive. This is short-lived, as the residual turns
negative and continues to decrease through 2018. From 1990, the power distribution by
socioeconomic class was less equal than anticipated, until just after 2010, when it became
more equal before then tending towards a virtual monopoly by the wealthy in France.

Figure 4-7: Power Distributed by Socioeconomic Position residuals from 1990 to 2018
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Power distribution by socioeconomic position is the last of the selected variables
whose residuals turned negative, indicating that the real values were much lower than
anticipated given all controls. These variables help paint the beginnings of the big picture
of which changes in French society, in this case, seem to have resulted in increased
protest activity and the arising of the yellow vest protest movement. This is not to say
that all of these variables support this conclusion, though the majority of those selected
seem to. The remaining variables fall under the nonexplanatory category.
4.3 Explanations That Can Be Ruled Out
There are four variables whose residuals do not seem to explain the observed
increase in protest activity in France led by the yellow vest movement. In order for this to
be the case, any variable’s residual in this category would have to see an increase in
recent years, indicating that actual values for that variable were higher than anticipated.
For explanatory variables in the previous section, it was generally true that lower values
were expected to be positively correlated with protests. This holds true for most of the
variables in this section, but instead higher values will be examined. These higher values
are expected to be negatively correlated with protest activity. That is, an increase in
magnitude in these variables is not expected to result in protesting by the French people.
The first variable that can be ruled out as an explanation measures social class
equality in respect for civil liberty. This variable will be referred to as v2clacjust,
consistent with the V-Dem codebook. For this variable, the higher in magnitude the
values go, the less observed inequality between the social classes. The highest possible
value is 4, indicating that poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people
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(Pemstein). For v2clacjust in Figure 4-8, the residual begins lower than expected, but
increases in the early 1990s, becoming higher than anticipated. While the residual
decreases from the early 1990s through 2018, it remains positive. In other words, social
class equality initially was lower than anticipated. Equality then became much higher
than what would’ve been predicted given the political regime. This continued through
2018, therefore social class equality or inequality cannot be used to explain the observed
increase in protests.

Figure 4-8: Social Class Equality and Civil Liberty residuals from 1990 to 2018

Next is the variable v2excrptps, which measures the rates of corrupt exchanges by
public sector employees. The highest value for this variable, 4, indicates hardly any levels
of corrupt exchanges by public sector employees (Pemstein). The residual for v2excrptps
shown in Figure 4-9 are initially negative in the 1990s, but increase dramatically in 1999-
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2000. The residual remains positive through all available data, despite small fluctuations
in the 2010s. Therefore, actual rates of corrupt exchanges by public sector were initially
lower than expected. At around 2000, the increase in the residual means higher actual
levels for this variable. Since higher levels indicate lower rates of corrupt exchanges, the
residual implies that there was less corruption by public sector employees than would be
predicted given the political regime. This would not likely result in an increase in
protesting, and thus should not be considered an explanation for the yellow vest
movement.

Figure 4-9: Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges residuals from 1990 to 2018

The third is v2lgcrrpt, which measures corrupt activities by the legislature. Similar
to the variable for public sector corrupt exchanges, the highest value indicates that
legislative corruption is practically nonexistent (Pemstein). In Figure 4-10, the residual
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for v2lgcrrpt remains fairly close to zero from 1990 to around 2012-2013. For those
years, this means that the level of legislative corruption was what was predicted. After
around 2012-2013, the residual increased sharply through 2018, excluding a few years in
the mid-2010s where the residual increased, but at a lower rate. The higher residual
means higher actual values for v2lgcrrpt controlling for the political regime. Higher
actual values indicate lower rates of corruption, so the residual implies that the rate of
corrupt activities by the legislature were lower than predicted. Consequently, legislative
corruption does not appear to explain the yellow vest protests.

Figure 4-10: Legislature Corrupt Activities residuals from 1990 to 2018

Lastly, v2clsocgrp, the variable measuring social group equality, for which the
highest value (four) indicates that members of all salient social groups enjoy the same
level of civil liberties (Pemstein). The residual for this variable followed a peculiar trend.
After increasing until around 2012, the residual decreases dramatically, becoming
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negative. Then, it is followed by a larger increase in the mid-2010s, becoming positive
again. This meant that from 1990 to roughly 2012, social group equality was higher than
expected. It then became much lower than expected for a period of a few years, before
increasing again. Therefore, the impact that changes in this variable had on the activity of
the yellow vest movement is inconclusive, and like the previous variables in this section,
cannot be used to explain the movement.

Figure 4-11: Social Group Equality residuals from 1990 to 2018

The first three variables in this section: social class equality with respect for civil
liberty, corrupt exchanges by public sector employees, corrupt activities by the
legislature, each saw their residual remain positive, i.e., higher than anticipated. The
fourth variable, measuring social group equality, followed a unique pattern and provided
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an inconclusive effect on protest activity. For these variables, the residuals suggested that
the actual values trended towards those that would not be to be correlated with an
increase in protests. Therefore, these variables are not considered to be possible causes of
the yellow vest movement.
4.4 Summary of Results
Eleven variables that were chosen for this thesis. The first of these, involving antisystem activity, was used in order to show the increasing amount of unrest in France. The
residual for this variable implied that anti-system movement activity was much higher
than anticipated for the years of 2012 to 2018. This is largely due to the arising of the
yellow vest movement. For the remaining variables, the residual, which explains the
difference between the actual observed value of the variable and what was predicted,
after controlling for political regimes (see section 3), was plotted over time. This was
done in order to determine which, if any, could possibly be used in order to provide an
explanation for the arising of the yellow vest protest movement. In total, six variables fit
the criteria to be considered possible explanations. The residuals for these six variables
were observed to be negative, indicating that actual values for the variables were much
lower than anticipated. Generally, lower values were expected to be correlated with
increased protesting by the public, which is why these six were selected to be possible
explanations.
The next four variables did not follow this pattern. For each, the residuals taking
values that were higher than predicted for the political regime of the time. Since higher
values are not expected to correlate positively with protesting, these could be ruled out as
possible explanations for the yellow vest movement.
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5. CONCLUSION
Just one year after the inauguration of Emmanuel Macron in France, an online
petition supported by a million French people quickly turned into public demonstrations.
Largely against the widely unpopular fuel tax hikes, the movement became known by the
yellow vests worn by its participants. This is symbolic because these vests are required to
be in the vehicles of commercial drivers in France. Protestors began flocking to Paris and
many other large cities in France throughout the country. With hundreds of thousands of
protestors and estimated damages in the hundreds of millions, it begs the question of
what exactly has been happening in France to cause such an uprising. The purpose of this
thesis was to determine which changes in France could have been responsible for the
yellow vest movements.
To that end, a selection of variables was chosen from the Varieties of Democracy
database. These variables measured changes in various aspects in French society over
time. The residual, equivalent to the difference between the actual value and the predicted
value controlling for various dummy variables, was plotted from 1990 to 2018, the most
recently available data. In general, for each of these variables, lower values were
expected to be positively correlated with higher protest activity, and higher values with
less protest activity. Thus, when the residuals were lower than expected given all
controls, those variables were counted as possible explanations for the arising of the
yellow vest protest movement.
In total, there were six explanatory variables: executive embezzlement and theft,
executive respect for the constitution, civil society organization (CSO) repression,
rigorous and impartial public administration, educational equality, and power distribution
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by socioeconomic position. Each of these variables had residuals that tended to be much
lower than predicted, which would be expected to result in an increase in protest activity.
There were four variables that did not appear to explain the movement: social class
equality, legislature corruption, public sector corrupt exchanges, and social group
equality. Their residuals tended toward higher values, indicating that the actual values of
their variables were higher than expected, which would not be consistent the rise of the
yellow vest movement.
While many of the demands made by the protestors could be ideological in nature,
there exists parallels between the demands and the data from the Varieties of Democracy
database. Many of the claims within the four categories are interrelated both with each
other and with the selected variables. For example, one of larger ideas behind the
movement is the idea of restoring liberty and/or equality to French citizens. This is
embodied in the demands from 2.2 calling for a constitutional amendment that protects
the people’s interests, and a prohibition on state interference in the decision-making
processes of French citizens.
Many of the variables that were determined to be potential explanations for the
movement, such as executive respect for the constitution, rigorous and impartial public
administration, and power distribution by socioeconomic position, fit under these larger
ideals of equality and liberty. The conclusion for each of these three variables is that they
were much lower than anticipated given the political regime, which was expected to be
met with an increase in protest activity. So naturally, once the protesting became more
ubiquitous, aspects of French life appeared in their official list of demands.
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On the other hand, demands relating to the corruption of Macron’s administration
did not seem to be supported by the analysis. More specifically, this is exemplified by the
demands calling for respect of international law (2.4) and the barring of lobby groups
from political decision-making (2.2), among others. These demands also correlated with
the variables involving corruption, such as legislative corruption and public sector corrupt
exchanges. The two variables here were ruled out as possible explanations, as they were
observed to be higher than anticipated. This indicates that the aforementioned variables
should not lead to an increase in protesting. However, it is interesting to see that ideas
pertaining to these variables have persisted in the list of demands by the movement.
One could argue that the reason for many of these demands could be ideological,
and not based on observations of reality. Ideological demands could be those which call
for an ending of non-secular education practices (2.2), a ban on GMO crops (2.3), or
perhaps ending France’s participation in what the movement determines to be wars of
aggression (2.4). While some of these demands may be simply ideological in nature, and
hard to quantify, there were demands that did align with the data. The variables relating
to these demands fell under both categories: those that could be used to explain the
observed increase in protest activity, and those that were ruled out as explanations.
The future of the yellow vests remains uncertain. It would seem as though the
public has grown tired of the interminable protesting. Several polls have been conducted
by Odoxa, an independent polling agency in France. These polls measured public
response to the protestors as well as their sentiments towards the movement overall. In a
recent poll, conducted online February 20-21, 2019, a majority of respondents (55%)
desired for the protesting to end. This marked the first time that this occurred, and was a
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stark contrast to the minority 34% of respondents that didn’t support the movement in
November 2018 (Bisserbe).
Despite this decline in public support for the movement, which has been in
continuity for approximately 74 weeks or so, protestors have continued to flock to the
streets. On March 14th of this year, just over a month ago, large crowds of yellow vests
demonstrated in Paris, in direct violation of the government’s ban on public gatherings
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This protest, like many of its predecessors, was
met with large numbers of French security personnel, who were forced to use tear gas on
the crowds and to detain several of its members (Irish and Pennetier).
In conclusion, these eleven variables were only a small sample of the almost six
hundred variables covering from 1789 to 2018 in France. The small sample covered
different of aspects of French society, but certainly not all. Therefore, there are certainly
other variables or external factors that could have led to the yellow vests. This thesis
sought to simply provide a sample of the big picture, and to uncover the remainder would
require more time and research.
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